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Abstract
This paper examines the adequacy of the enforcement
efforts of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Council (CRMC) in carrying out the rules and regUlations of
the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program
(CRMP). This analysis describes the Federal and state
mandates and contributions to the enforcement of the Rhode
Island CRMP, determines the legitimacy of the CRMC through
Superior Court cases, examines CRMC enforcement activities,
and determines the compliance to CRMC cease and desist
orders.
The research finds that the CRMC has not enforced its
regulatory responsibilities well. Actual compliance to
cease and desist orders was only 41%. It may be that
compliance with the CRMP is significantly lower due to a
perceived high level of undetected violations.
This enforcement problem has been due to administrative
problems, both within the CRMC and between the CRMC and
other state agencies; insufficient staff and resources,
inadequate enforcement procedures with the existing
resources: and minimal federal oversight and pressure to
correct the problems.
The CRMC has recently been addressing some of these
enforcement problems. However, it is too early to determine
if the new enforcement initiatives will secure a greater
level of compliance with the Rhode Island CRMP.
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Introduction
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) provided
the opportunity for coastal states, the Great Lake states,
the u.s. territories, and the federal government to develop
and implement federally approved state coastal zone
management programs. This partnership arose out of the
growing need to conserve coastal resources while
accommodating increasing coastal development and resource
exploitation demands.
The CZMA provided development funds for state coastal
zone management programs (CZMPs). Once a program met the
federal requirements, federal implementation funds became
available. Approved state programs receiving these funds
became bound to adhere to their federally approved CZMPs and
annual grants. While the federal office responsible for
administering, monitoring and guiding the state programs
periodically reviews the CZMPs for annual grant and program
compliance, there has been no concerted effort to determine
the adequacy of the state CZMP's enforcement efforts in
carrying out their mandates to conserve coastal resources
and secure some level of compliance to the federally
approved state CZMP enforcement measures.
This paper will attempt to determine the importance and
success of enforcement systems in the implementation of
state coastal resource management regulations by looking at
an early coastal zone management program, the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Program (RICRMP) from 1971 -
1986.
Efforts to analyze the implementation of federal and
state environmental regulatory agencies have too often
neglected the enforcement element of environmental
regulations. The work done in this area has predominantly
been concerned with air and water pollution (Hawkins, 1984),
and fisheries law enforcement (Hennessey and sutinen;
Fraily; Matera; Pallozi; et. al.). Analysis of state
coastal zone management programs has been limited to
descriptions of program development and regulatory methods
(i.e., Brower, 1984; Fischer, 1984; Kinsey, 1984; and,
Owens, 1984). There has been no evaluation of the
enforcement efforts of these programs or an attempt to
determine levels of compliance with the regulations and/or
enforcement efforts.
Federal coastal zone managers are also concerned that
the states know what is actually happening to their coastal
resources and that there is an "acceptable" level of
compliance to the federally approved and monitored CZMPs.
However, they have not been able to perform indepth
evaluations of the state programs and the states do not
evaluate themselves. Federal coastal managers have been
constrained by a lack of resources and administrative will
to effectively evaluate the state CZMPs.
In order to evaluate the success of regulatory agencies
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in meeting the goals of coastal resource management
legislation the behavior of the agencies must be examined.
A key to effective environmental management is the degree of
compliance with the regulations, provided that regulation is
desired by state citizens and the policies and regulations
formulated are based on sound information implemented in a
reasonable and equitable manner.
An analysis of the coastal resources management
enforcement process includes the following five main
components:
(1) Program Policy, Legislation and Regulations. This
includes the enabling legislation and policy as
specified by the state Legislature and the regulations
as promulgated by the CRMC.
(2) Program Resources. These include the federal and state
resources allocated to the implementing state agency to
carry out its responsibilities.
(3) Implementation. The agency is carrying out the
policies, developing and implementing procedures and
decision criteria, issuing permits, cease and desist
orders, and initiating court action to enforce the
regulations. Through adaptive implementation policy is
also being made at this stage (see chapter 3).
(4) Level of Compliance. As a result of the implementation
of the regulatory program there will be some level of
compliance to agency decisions.
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(5) Evaluation. After determining the compliance level a
comparison of the level of compliance with agency
decisions must be made to determine if the regulations
and implementation methods utilized by the CRMC have
been adequate in meeting the policies and goals of the
state Legislature.
While the level of compliance may be determined the
benefits to society and the environment are less tangible.
Some would argue that increased land use regulation is a
hindrance to production and therefore an economic burden on
society. others would argue that without land use
regulation, especially in an environmentally important area
such as the coastal zone, development has in the past and
would continue to cause serious problems for species
habitats, water quality, recreational opportunities and for
the general well-being or quality of life for u.s. citizens.
Several states were pursuing coastal management
initiatives prior to the enactment of the CZMA. However,
these efforts were for the most part in anticipation of the
federal program. The contribution of the federal program to
the RICRMP enforcement efforts is discussed in Chapter 2.
In Rhode Island emerging coastal resource management issues
were identified in the early 1970s, state legislation was
created to deal with these issues, and the new state agency,
the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), had to
implement their mandate with few resources, reliance on
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other state agencies, and limited guidance from the State
General Assembly (Chapter 3). With the influence of the
Federal Coastal Zone Management Program the RICRMP gained
resources and momentum. However, the irony of the RICRMP
was, that, while the CRMC was increasing its CZM efforts and
defending its legal status (Chapter 4) there was an
inconsistent and relatively ineffective effort to enforce
their decisions (Chapter 5 and 6).
This research will build upon existing work accomplished
in the field of pOlicy implementation in coastal zone
management and enforcement of environmental regulations by
evaluating state coastal resource management policies at
perhaps the most important implementation stage:
enforcement. Without adequate enforcement and compliance of
the regulations strong "paper" policies will have little
effect on the resources the program was designed for.
Enforcement of the regulations reflects the ability and
willingness of a regulatory agency to implement the original
goals and policies of its enabling legislation.
The hypothesis to be tested is that the enforcement
efforts of the Rhode Island CRMC have been inadequate for
the purpose of carrying out the rules and regulations of the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP).
In order to fully explain the CRMC enforcement efforts
and make recommendations to improve those efforts various
facets of the Rhode Island coastal zone management effort
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must be discussed. This includes the regulatory authority
for state CZMPs, the impetus behind the RICRMP, subsequent
RICRMP development and implementation and the constraints
and demands placed on the RICRMP. The desirability of a
Rhode Island coastal resource management program will be
examined in light of John Kingdon's work on agenda-setting
(Kingdon, 1984). The development of the CRMC's current
policies and enforcement mechanisms will be described with
the help of adaptive implementation theory. Following these
discussions on how Rhode Island's CRMP enforcement efforts
evolved, the use of the enforcement mechanisms and
compliance with these efforts will be evaluated.
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Chapter 2 - The Federal contribution to the RICRMP
The federal Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management (OCRM) is largely responsible for the RICRMP and
is partly responsible for the effectiveness of the Rhode
Island program due to its control of federal CZMP funds and
its monitoring responsibilities under the federal Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA). The authority of the states
under the CZMA comes from the perceived need by national
decision makers in the 1960s, the Act itself, and the
implementation of the CZMA by the federal coastal resource
management office.
The Creation of the CZMA
The CZMA was "brought about by discrete and sometimes
discordant constituencies motivated by a variety of concerns
advocating the pursuit of diverse goals by a wide range of
means" (Zile, 1974). Simply put, in the 1960s, the coastal
areas were becoming increasingly valuable to mUltiple and
often conflicting user groups.
In the early 1960's, coastal areas were increasing in
recreational value (Zile, 1974). By the mid 1960's, outdoor
recreation was one of the top ten U.S. economic activities
with annual federal expenditures around $1 billion (National
Water commission, 1973).
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At the same time that recreational concerns were
emerging for the coastal zone the ecological importance of
estuaries was becoming a focus for pUblic concern, resource
management efforts and scientific research. In the early
1960's, a number of initiatives were debated in Congress
that would have provided for a national program for the
protection of estuaries. At the time, estuaries were viewed
as the most critically endangered coastal habitats (Zile,
1974). These initiatives led to the passing of the Estuary
Protection Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1221 et.seq.). In 1966,
the Clean Water Restoration Act launched a comprehensive
study of the effects of pollution on estuaries. This
resulted in the National Estuarine Pollution study which
concluded that the management problems of estuaries were
inseparably related to the surrounding coastal zone and that
a sound management system should encompass the coastal zone
in its entirety (U.S. Department of Interior, 1970).
The study set forth a detailed blueprint of how this
could be accomplished. Other studies and investigations of
this period came to similar conclusions. These included the
Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources 1969
report, the Workshop on Critical Problems of the Coastal
Zone (Ketchum, 1972) and studies such as those of the
National Academy of Sciences (1970) on waste disposal in the
coastal zone. Nevertheless, a comprehensive approach to
estuarine policy as suggested by these studies was not
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achieved.
From the mid to late 1960's, coastal zone management
initiatives became more development-oriented. In 1966,
Congress passed the Marine Resources and Engineering Act
(MREA). Unlike the estuarine initiatives, the MREA favored
development over environmental quality (Zile, 1974).
In 1969 the Commission on Marine Science and Resources
Report, Our Nation and the Sea, commonly referred to as the
Stratton commission and Stratton Report, was released. The
Stratton Commission was established by section five of the
MREA and mandated that the commission report on ocean
issues. Much of what the commission recommended was later
incorporated into the CZMA in some form.
The report recommended that the states should have
primary responsibility for implementation of a Coastal Zone
Management Act. The report also proposed that this program
be housed in a new National oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). While the Stratton commission's
independent NOAA proposal was not supported, a less ocean
centralized NOAA was created under the Department of
Commerce. Eventually the federal Coastal Zone Management
Program office was placed under NOAA.
The impetus to create a comprehensive coastal Zone
Management Act was still not strong enough in the late
1960's. This was due primarily to congressional battles as
to what form the legislation should take.
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Congressional and Administration interest focused on
land use legislation. These decision makers felt that there
could be no rational policy toward the land component of the
coastal zone in the absence of a policy toward the
management of all lands (Zile, 1974).
Despite the interest given the land use bills,
supporters of coastal zone management legislation were
succeeding in Congress. In the Spring of 1972, the
Subcommittee on oceanography of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries unanimously approved the
coastal zone bill, HR9229, with amendments (H. Rep. No.
1544, 92d Cong, 2nd Session. 10(1972». A similar Senate
bill passed, S582, and in April of 1972, a new Senate bill
was passed and referred to the House, which became the CZMA
(Zile, 1974).
The CZHA Mandate
The U.S. Congress specifically designated the states as
"The key to more effective protection and use of the land
and water resources of the coastal zone ••• (16 USC 1451
(i»." Congress declared four basic national policies and
nine performance standards for states to follow as the
underlying base for the national coastal management program.
The four basic national policies are:
(1) "to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to
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restore or enhance" the coastal resources of the United
states (section 303(1».
(2) "to encourage and assist the states" to develop and
implement "management programs to achieve the wise use
of the land and water resources of the coastal zone ...
(section 303(2»."
(3) "to encourage the preparation of special area management
plans" to increase the "specificity in
protecting significant natural resources" and addressing
various coastal related activities (section 303(3».
(4) "to encourage the participation and cooperation of the
public, state and local governments," interstate,
regional and federal agencies .•• "in carrying out the
purposes of this title (section 303 (4» ."
Section 303(2) of the CZMA specifies the minimal
performance standards that state programs should provide
for. They are:
(1) "the protection of natural resources ••• within the
coastal zone (section 303(2) (A»."
(2) "the management of coastal development to minimize the
loss of life and property caused by improper
development ..• (section 303(2) (B»."
(3) "priority consideration .•• to coastal development uses
and orderly processes for siting major facilities
related to national defense, energy, fisheries
development, recreation, ports and transportation and
the location" of new development to areas of similar
development (section 303(2) (c».
(4) "public access to the coasts for recreation purposes
(section 303(2) (D»."
(5) "assistance in the redevelopment of deteriorating urban
waterfronts and ports and •.• preservation and
restoration of historic, cultural, and aesthetic coastal
features (section 303(2) (E»."
(6) simplify procedures to "ensure expedited" coastal
resource management decision-making (section 303(2) (F».
(7) "consultation and coordination with" and "consideration
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to the views of, affected federal agencies (section
303 (2) (G) ) ."
(8) providing for "public and local government participation
in coastal management decision-making (section
303 (2) (H» ."
(9) "assistance to support comprehensive planning,
conservation, and management for living marine
resources, including planning for the siting of
pollution control and aquaculture facilities within the
coastal zone and improve coordination between state and
Federal ..• agencies ... (section 303(2) (I»."
These national policies and state program performance
standards provided the federal authority for Rhode Island to
enforce its coastal management laws.
Federal CZMA Implementation
Some of Rhode Islands enforcement problems can be traced
back to federal implementation of the CZMA. The early years
were characterized by the rush to approve state programs
(Matuszeski, 1985). Congress had allotted finite section
305 planning funds. Programs that had been approved would
then be eligible for section 306 implementation funds. The
success of the federal Coastal Zone Management Program was
measured by the number of states approved by the federal CZM
officials (Matuszeski, 1985), but not necessarily on the
substance of the programs or the enforceability of the state
programs. Congressional support for the program would
probably have waned if few states were approved.
By 1979 nineteen of the thirty-five states and
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territories eligible under the program were approved. By
1982 this number grew to twenty-eight, the twenty-ninth,
virginia, being added in 1986.
The emphasis on program approval was a disappointment to
advocates of strong federal oversight of the program
(Matuszeski, 1985). Matuszeski also notes that opponents to
a strong federal role "were relieved to see that Congress
had enacted a statute that not only limited the federal
role, but assured that federal officials were totally
occupied trying to define its requirements for the states"
(Matuszeski, 1985).
Problems began to arise when it became clear that some
states had enacted or would enact coastal management
legislation while others were developing programs based on
existing programs and statutes called the "networking"
approach. The networking approach was used for states with
insufficient direct regulatory authority. These programs
were approved if they developed a coordinating process among
the various state agencies that would carry out the state
CZMP. The lead agencies in these states were to monitor the
day to day business of the other state agencies (Lowry,
1985). Networking was endorsed by the federal officials
because of difficulties in passing coastal specific
legislation in state legislatures. Rhode Island was
initially a "networked" state but with coastal specific
legislation and a statewide coastal development permit.
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In the end the federal office required three key areas
be addressed for program approval:
(1) The scope of the proposed program to address the
major coastal issues in that state;
(2) Level of specificity required in the state policies
to deal with the major issues; and,
(3) Enforceability of the policies through statutes,
regulations, and other authorities (Matuszeski,
1985).
The federal office addressed the question of what is
sufficient to meet the three requirements by a program of
"clear flexibility" (Matuszeski, 1985). This enabled the
federal office to approve programs based on individual state
issues and legislation.
The CZMA was vague, planning funds were finite,
Congressional support was needed for the program's survival,
and the programs dealt in the extremely controversial area
of governmental regulations over private land use. However,
with emphasis on program approval and a lack of substantive
enforcement provisions, the coastal programs were approved
too easily and with not enough "teeth" in them.
While it is debatable as to the quality of some of the
federally approved coastal programs, there was, and still
is, the opportunity for the federal office to influence the
direction a state program can take through the
implementation grants. The Office of Ocean and Coastal
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Resource Management (OCRM) , formerly the Office of Coastal
Zone Management, of NOAA is the federal CZMA implementing
agency. states with federally approved CZM programs apply
to OCRM each year for grants which vary in dollar amounts
depending on the federal budgetary allocation and a
Congressional allocation formula based on a states'
population and length of shoreline. states work with OCRM
staff to address monitoring and enforcement efforts by
agreeing on significant Improvement Tasks, special Award
Conditions, local projects, various proposed section 306
tasks, and basic program administration which includes
monitoring and enforcing the state's CZM program. All of
these are how the federal coastal zone managers can
influence Rhode Islands resource conservation and program
enforcement efforts.
section 306 Tasks
Some section 306 Tasks of a state's CZMA grant include
basic operating tasks, i.e., administration, salary, travel,
supplies, state agency coordination, monitoring of projects,
etc. These tasks do not change much year to year. Other
section 306 tasks may include enforcement/ monitoring
projects, special management or scientific studies, that are
either done in-house or contracted out, or grants to local
governments to produce local plans, projects, and
15
,ordinances, etc, to enforce coastal management laws and
policies at the local level.
Significant Improvement Tasks
Some 306 tasks or portions of 306 tasks are determined
to be Significant Improvement Tasks or SIG tasks. The CZMA
mandates that state CZM programs spend an increasing amount
of 306 funds each year, up to 30 percent, on SIG tasks that
are approved by OCRM (16 U.S.C. 1455(9) (1982». These
tasks are supposed to be innovative initiatives that address
national coastal zone management issues. SIG tasks are
often in response to recommendations that the OCRM includes
in section 312 evaluation findings. However, the federal
office has not required the CRMC to improve its enforcement
capabilities through the use of SIG tasks.
special Award Conditions to Financial Assistance Awards
Special Award Conditions (SACs) are used by NOAA to
condition federal grants to states. SACs insure state
adherence to the relevant NOAA/OCRM regulations, pOlicies,
and OCRM staff conditions. OCRM staff conditions are
usually based on previous state performance in administering
their 306 awards and on the section 312 evaluation
recommendations. States must adhere to the SACs in order to
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receive project funds. Special award conditions are one of
the few tools available to the OCRM to affect the
performance of a State's grant. However, special award
conditions have not been utilized to affect CRMC enforcement
efforts.
Section 312 Evaluations
Section 312 of the CZMA mandates that, "the Secretary
[of Commerce] shall conduct a continuing review of the
performance of coastal states ••• " (sec. 312(a». The
evaluation also includes a review of the state's
implementation and enforcement of their approved programs,
addressing the coastal management needs specified in section
303(2) (A-I), and determines if the state is adhering to its
current grant award.
The states are generally reviewed every two years. The
evaluation team consists of a staff member from the OCRM's
Policy and Coordination Division, the state's OCRM Coastal
Program Division (CPO) lead staff contact and usually a CZM
program representative from another state.
Written evaluations have been, for the most part, of
limited use in determining actual state performance. One
reason for this is that the site evaluation lasts for no
more than a week. With such little time the written reports
are never very probing (Archer, 1987). Another problem is
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the rigidity of the review process. This has resulted in
many reports being very similar (Archer, 1987). The federal
government is also inhibited by a shortage of program
management funds. The OCRM lacks the resources and staff to
more effectively investigate and monitor the state programs.
The 312 evaluations are one of the few tools available
to OCRM to affect state CZM performance. However, they have
not been used by the OCRM to improve CRMC enforcement
capabilities.
state Benefits from the Federal Contribution
Most coastal states, inclUding Rhode Island, had
realized the need for some type of coastal resource
management from the late 1960's to the early 1970's. Even
without the federal CZMA there would probably have been, and
there were, coastal zone management efforts. The CZMA gave
all the coastal states a process and guidelines to follow to
arrive at enforceable coastal resource management programs.
The CZMA also offered the states limited program development
and implementation funds and the use of federal consistency
to enforce coastal management laws.
Federal CZMA Funding
Federal CZMA funds, though limited, play an important
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role in Rhode Island's CZMP enforcement efforts. The
coastal states have received various levels of funding for
their CZMA programs since 1974. The states are required to
match a certain percentage of this federal award. This
match will increase to 60% federal and 40% state for fiscal
1988. The state match will increase and remain at 50% in
fiscal 1989.
As the section 305 development funds declined in the
late 1970s section 306 implementation funds rose to almost
$36 million in 1978 (figure 1). This funding level steadily
increased to over $41 million by 1982. However, during this
time other CZMA funds were being cut. The large drop in
total CZMA funding between 1978 and 1983 was largely due to
the end of 305 development funds and section 308 Coastal
Energy Impact Program (CEIP) funds declining from $132
million in 1978 to under $7 million in 1983 (figure 2).
CEIP funds were largely the result of the 1970's energy
crisis. Large amounts of funding were allotted for energy
facility impact analyses. As the energy crunch waned so did
the CEIP funds.
Section 306 funding was also drastically cut in 1983 and
1984. However, Congress restored implementation funds to
near previous levels in 1985. In 1983 Congress also amended
the CZMA to include section 309 interstate grants (16 U.S.C.
1451, as amended). These grants were designed to foster
increased federal/state/interstate coordination and
19
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Figure 2
Federal CZMA Funding (1986 Dollars)
Planning Implment. CEIP Interstate Assist Reserves TOTAL ALL
YEAR 305 306 308 309 310 315 PROGRAMS
74 15621830 0 0 0 0 1788080 17409910
75 18161820 0 0 0 0 3686500 21848320
76 33975080 3820000 0 0 0 1146000 38941080
77 33120370 7185060 2076400 0 0 2874740 45256570
78 20115150 35843210 132026860 0 58450 499330 188543000
79 7791000 38614500 70219500 0 85500 4500000 121210500
80 0 43189080 80101560 0 190080 3857040 127653240
81 0 43725600 43472400 0 0 2670000 91816800
82 0 41487950 9245660 0 0 3238580 54263730
83 0 6147600 6966190 272500 0 2636710 16956040
84 0 16578450 598500 315000 0 27783550 21108150
85 0 41326170 41410 909000 0 4591460 47639680
86 0 32443000 0 1055000 0 2743000 36241000
87 0 38598000 92000 1001000 0 3586000 43277000
TOTAL 128785250 348958620 344840480 3552500 334030 65600990 872165020
Source: NOAA Grants Office CZMA BUdget Report.
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management of interstate waterbody resource needs.
The remaining CZMA funds include a few years of limited
section 310, Research and Technical Assistance for Coastal
Zone Management funds, and section 315, the Estuarine
Reserve Research System, funds. Section 310 funding stopped
in 1980 and the section was repealed in 1986. Section 315
has been subject to the same lack of Reagan Administration
support as has section 306.
Adequate financial resources are essential for
successful implementation and enforcement of coastal
resource management regulations. Without the section 305
federal funds in the mid 1970s, the initial planning work
would not have been carried out. In fact, during its early
years, the Coastal Resources Center at the University of
Rhode Island had to rely upon Sea Grant funds and direct
support from the Graduate School of Oceanography to carry
out its responsibilities to the CRMC (Robadue, 1986).
Financial resources declined steadily during the
implementation phase after 1976, at a time when development
activity in the coastal region was expanding, and the CRMC
was adopting many new policies and plans which required
implementation and enforcement efforts.
The federal funds have been instrumental in state
program development and implementation. In the case of
Rhode Island, when federal funds are cut CRMC management and
enforcement efforts suffer (see chapter 4).
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The Reagan Administration has consistently zero-budgeted
the CZMA program. However, Congress has allotted CZMA funds
to keep the programs alive. CZMA proponents fear that
without the federal support many of the state programs would
be disbanded.
Federal Consistency
The other impetus for state participation in the CZMA
was the use of federal consistency. The federal consistency
doctrine requires that federally permitted, funded, and
direct federal activities "directly affecting" the coastal
zone be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with
the states' federally approved coastal zone management
programs (16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (1) (3) 1982).
Consistent to the "maximum extent practicable" for
activities by federal agencies is determined by the federal
agency (15 CFR 930.32). If a state disagrees they may find
the consistency determination and the project to be
inconsistent with their CZM programs.
If the state denies a federally permitted activity the
permit applicant may appeal to the Secretary of Commerce.
The state's objection may be overturned if the Secretary
finds the project to be consistent with the national
objectives of the CZMA or necessary in the interest of
national security (16 U.S.C. 1456(c) (3)1982).
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Much has been written on the Federal Consistency
Doctrine and how it has been interpreted under the Reagan
Administration. What is meant by "directly affecting" and
"consistent to the maximum extent practicable" is still not
clear, despite the Supreme Court decision in California v.
the Secretary of the Interior, 104 S. ct. 656 (1984). It
will probably take additional legislative action to clarify
the Consistency Doctrine. Despite the confusion that
federal consistency has caused, through both jUdicial
interpretation and OCRM requirements on the use of federal
consistency, many states have been able to utilize this as
an implementation/enforcement mechanism to halt or modify
direct federal, federally permitted, and federally funded
activities. A recent article claims that the federal
consistency provisions are unconstitutional, superfluous and
should be repealed (Whitney, 1988). However, this article
fails to realize the congressional intent in including the
federal consistency provisions, as noted in a response to
Whitney (Archer, 1988).
There has been a serious level of mistrust between the
state program managers and the federal office. This was due
in large part to the political appointees in NOAA who were
opposed to the goals of coastal zone management (Archer,
1987). OeRM leaders made it difficult for states to use
federal consistency in some instances and did not allowed
the federal OCRM CPO staff to promote innovative coastal
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management initiatives (Archer, 1987). There have been
serious allegations that the federal office has been
influenced by the Department of the Interior's Mineral
Management Service, and the oil and gas industry (Archer,
1987 and CZM Newsletter, 1987). This has made it difficult
for the federal office to work with the states in a more
innovative and effective fashion to secure greater
compliance to state programs.
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Chapter 3 Rhode islands CRMP _Development
The impetus for coastal resource management enforcement
in Rhode Island began in the late 1960s as more people
became aware of the importance of environmental protection.
However, initial interest in addressing coastal issues in
Rhode Island was primarily from the academic and planning
communities of the state and not from the general public.
An early study from the academic community received
considerable publicity because it contained the first
comprehensive summary of environmental conditions and
economic uses of Narragansett Bay (Alexander, 1966). The
study proposed that the Bay be zoned by the state in the
same manner that coastal municipalities were regulating land
use. An administrative mechanism for enforcing the Bay
zoning plan was also encouraged.
During the next three years, as coastal issues grew in
the state and across the nation, additional studies of the
value of Narragansett Bay were published. The final report
of the National Estuarine Pollution study in 1969 called for
the establishment of a new program for pollution control
which focused on cleaning up polluted water bodies such as
estuaries (u.s. Dept. of the Interior, 1970). That same
year the National Commission on Marine Science, Engineering
and Resources called attention to the increased degradation
of marine resources in the United States (National Academy
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of sciences, 1970). The University of Rhode Island
community was involved in both of these projects. The
university community and public officials of the Rhode
Island Statewide Planning Program, were aware of new state
and local coastal management initiatives throughout the
United states especially the establishment of the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
in 1969.
The result of this intense interest in coastal resources
was the preparation of a report by the National Resources
Group, a private organization composed of research, business
and civic leaders on the administration of Narragansett Bay
(Natural Resources Group, 1969). Rhode Island Governor
Frank Licht responded to the proposal by establishing a
Committee on the Coastal Zone to identify the state's
coastal resource problems and recommend a course of action.
The political support needed to obtain legislative
approval for a new coastal environmental policy was
increased when, beginning in the early 1960's, a series of
potentially harmful environmental uses had been proposed for
Narragansett Bay. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was
serious about creating a massive hurricane barrier at the
mouth of the bay, stimulated by the widespread destruction
caused by Hurricane Carol in 1954. In addition several
companies were acquiring sites and preparing proposals to
construct oil refineries and nuclear power plants in
27
Narragansett Bay.
In response to this the Governor's Committee on the
Coastal Zone prepared a 135 page report, released in March
1970, discussing coastal environmental resources, uses and
problems, and proposed the creation of an 11 member coastal
zone council. This new agency was to include four state
agency heads and seven public members representing
environmental, business, research and local government
perspectives. This proposal for coastal resources
management was submitted to the General Assembly but was so
controversial that it was never reported out of committee
(Robadue, 1986).
The major issue raised was that the legislature did not
want to preempt traditional local control over land use
decisions (Cole, 1975). A new governor's committee was
formed in November 1970, composed of 68 members representing
every municipality, numerous federal and state agencies, and
a dozen invited private organizations. This expanded
committee debated the basic approach to be taken and
recommended increasing the representation of local
communities on the new agency.
The idea of creating a new mechanism for administering
coastal resources did not have much political salience in
itself. However, Kingdon's work on agenda setting
illustrates how a coastal resource management institution
developed and was implemented in Rhode Island (Kingdon,
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1984). According to Kingdon, regulatory agenda setting
consists of four processes:
(1) The setting of an agenda.
(2) The specification of alternatives from which a choice is
made:
(3) An authoritative choice among the specified
alternatives; and,
(4) The implementation of the decision (Kingdon, 1984).
Kingdon sees these processes as largely independent of
one another with each developing according to its own
dynamics and rules. But if the problems identified are to
get on the agenda, Kingdon argues, these processes must be
joined at some critical juncture or focusing event. The
greatest policy changes are associated with the coupling of
problems, policy proposals, and politics (Kingdon, 1984).
This coupling is most likely to occur when opportunities
for advancing particular views, or policy windows, are open.
As Kingdon observes, "Thus agendas are set by problems or
politics and alternatives are generated in the policy
stream." And, "While governmental agendas are set in the
problems on political streams, the chances of items rising
on the decision agenda--a list of items up for actual
action--are enhanced if all of the streams are coupled
together (Kingdon, 1984)."
In the early 1970s a policy window opened when a
proposal to construct an oil refinery in Tiverton, Rhode
Island provided the critical focusing event which placed
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coastal resource management high on Rhode Island's public
agenda. Public officials, legislators, and finally the
general pUblic realized that the town council of Tiverton, a
rural community, would make the final decision on whether
the refinery was built. The town's only regulatory tool was
a zoning ordinance that gave it no authority to control
environmental impacts.
In 1971 Save the Bay, a new citizen group formed to
fight the refinery, and John Lyons, a state representative
from Tiverton, lead a successful fight in the General
Assembly to create a new agency which could effectively
regulate such large industrial projects and serve as the key
institution in managing coastal resources. In July 1971 a
problem, policy proposals, and politics came together to
create the Coastal Resources Management Council.
Initial RICRHP ~namics
The Rhode Island General Assembly did not wish to create
a new state bureaucracy, particularly in view of intense
local concern over this encroachment by the state into a
traditionally local decision-making arena. As a result, the
CRMC was initially a "networked" CZM program with direct
permitting authority. The Division of Coastal Resources,
formerly the Division of Rivers and Harbors, located in the
Department of Environmental Management (created in 1977 to
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consolidate resource management and protection agencies),
provided administrative, engineering and clerical
assistance. Research and planning tasks were handled on a
contractual basis by the newly created Coastal Resources
Center at the University of Rhode Island. Legal assistance
was obtained from the firm of Goldman, Biafore and Hines,
although in theory the Attorney General's Office was
supposed to represent the CRMC in court cases. The
federally mandated project review coordination and federal
consistency determination, as well as numerous planning
tasks, were carried out by the statewide Planning Program.
Control over the federal funds received by the state
shifted several times. Until 1978, the federal funds were
administered by the Statewide Planning Program. After the
state became eligible for Section 306 implementation funds
in 1978, administration was shifted to a new Governor's
Office of Coastal Zone Management. This office was
subsequently abolished in 1981 due to its high cost and the
sharp decline in federal funds. Grant administration then
was placed directly in the Governor's Office. The CRMC
was composed of 17 members selected using a complex formula
to assure local representation:
Governor's Appointees
2 local officials from towns less than 25,000 in size
2 local officials from towns more than 25,000 in size
3 at large public members, approved by the Senate, the
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Director of the Department of Environmental Management
and the Director of the Department of Health.
General Assembly Appointees
2 representatives, one from a coastal town
2 senators, both from coastal towns
2 at large public members
2 at large pUblic members from coastal towns
This formula was quite different from the one originally
proposed by the 1970 Governor's Task Force and reflects the
result of bargaining during the 1971 legislative session
(Robadue, 1986). The CRMC's own staff remained small
through the mid 1970s, consisting only of the executive
director, an administrative assistant and the staff
biologists, who were transferred to the Division of Fish and
Wildlife during the creation of the Department of
Environmental Management in 1978.
Legislative Mandate of the Coastal Resources Manaaement
Council
Rhode Island's authority to promulgate and enforce
coastal resource management laws and regulations is derived
from two main sources. (1) Initially, the state coastal
resource management legislation created the CRMC and
mandated that the CRMC adopt and enforce policies and
regulations to protect coastal resources (Section 46-23-1 of
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the General Laws of Rhode Island of 1956 as amended). (2)
Later, the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(CZMA) allowed Rhode Island to further develop and enforce
coastal resource management laws and policies that met
federal guidelines (Chapter 3).
The state legislative findings declared that
"preservation and restoration of ecological systems shall be
the primary guiding principle upon which environmental
alteration of coastal resources will be measured, judged and
regulated." The enabling legislation of the CRMC specified
the basic pOlicy to
"preserve, protect, develop and where possible,
restore the coastal resources of the state for this
and succeeding generations through comprehensive and
coordination long-range planning and management
designed to produce the maximum benefit for society
from such coastal resources; and that preservation and
restoration of ecological systems shall be the primary
guiding principle upon which environmental alteration
of coastal resources will be measured, judged and
regulated" (Chapter 23 of the General Laws of Rhode
Island, section 46-23-1, legislative findings).
The legislative standards set for CRMC plans and
programs requires the CRMC to perform a balancing act,
instructing the CRMC to consider:
(1) The need and demand for various activities and their
impact upon ecological systems.
(2) The degree of compatibility of various activities.
(3) The capability of coastal resources to support various
activities (Chapter 23 of the General Laws of Rhode
Island, section 46-23-1, legislative findings).
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The General Assembly required the CRMC to "formulate
plans and programs for the management of each resource,
identifying permitted uses, location, protection measures,
etc (Chapter 23 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, section
46-23-1, legislative findings)." The statute directs the
CRMC to focus its attention on a specific list of activities
and areas for which it was given jurisdiction:
a. Power generation and desalination plants.
b. Chemical or petroleum processing, transfer or
storage.
c. Minerals ex~raction.
d. Shoreline protection facilities and physiographic
features.
e. Intertidal salt marshes.
f. Sewage treatment and disposal and solid waste
disposal facilities (Chapter 23 of the General Laws
of Rhode Island, section 46-23-1, legislative
findings).
The CRMC's enabling legislation specified the use of a
resource management process in which studies and plans were
to provide decision making criteria for the CRMC to employ
in exercising its implementing authority (permit process)
and its coordination responsibilities.
Planning methods were to be employed to generate
consensus on goals, conduct research on problems, analyze
alternative policies and produce a plan that the CRMC would
implement through regulation and coordination. However, the
General Assembly did not establish a time deadline for
carrying out this planning process nor did it instruct the
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CRMC on how to car~ out the mUltiple roles of regulator,
policy maker and enforcer.
Actual enforcement authority is under Chapter 23,
section 3, Subsection 46-23-7 of the General Laws of Rhode
Island, which authorizes the CRMC to issue cease and desist
orders to stop and/or remedy a violation of the Rhode Island
coastal program. A violation of the program is defined as,
"any development, operation, alteration or construction in
an area under Council jurisdiction which is:
(1) Undertaken without a valid Council assent.
(2) Undertaken in a manner other than that prescribed in
such as assent where one has been issued.
(3) Continued after a written cease and desist order has
issued by the Councilor its authorized agents; or
(4) Undertaken after a restoration order has been issued by
the Council.
The Chairman of the Council and state conservation
officers are empowered to issue written cease and desist
orders, "in any instance where activity is being conducted
which constitutes a violation of the Program or a violation
of the Statute, regulations or decisions of the Council."
The Chairman is empowered to issue restoration orders when
the violation is not redressed and is determined to be
capable of causing adverse environmental impacts or is
inconsistent with program regulations.
A violation of a Council cease and desist order is a
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misdemeanor and is punishable by no more than a $300 fine or
three months imprisonment, or both if convicted. Each day a
violation or failure to comply continues is deemed a
separate offense.
The Rhode Island legislative mandate authorizes the CRMC
to enforce its regulations and policies. The next section
discusses the implementation of the RICRMP policies.
Implementation of the RICRMP
CRMC enforcement efforts are partially shaped by the
development of the RICRMP. The development of the RICRMP
includes not only the federal coastal resource management
office's contribution and responsibilities, the creation of
the CRMC, and the enabling legislation, but, also the
implementation of their coastal resource management mandate.
Coastal resource management must take place within an
institutional setting and policy process which attempts to
reconcile the differing values and objectives of a variety
of user groups and the general public and then provide the
means for implementing chosen objectives (Robadue, 1986).
Implementation refers to those activities that follow
statutes, pOlicies, and goals as specified by legislators
and government officials (Ripley and Franklin, 1982).
Implementation includes actions and non-actions by a variety
of actors, especially bureaucrats, mandated to put programs
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into effect, hopefully in such a way as to achieve the
program's goals (Sproule-Jones, 1977).
In Rhode Island, the CRMC was established to implement
new coastal resource management policies and goals.
However, a major part of the work of the new agency was to
develop the specific procedures and regulatory policies to
be implemented. The traditional model of implementation
assumes that "policy making supercedes pOlicy
implementation" and that compliance follows directly from
the creation of a hierarchical, centrally controlled
government institution (Nakamura, 1980). However,
this traditional model is unable to explain much of the
behavior which has taken place in the implementation of the
RICRMP. The nature of the CRMC's mandate as an ecosystem
management agency precluded the General Assembly from being
overly specific about objectives and decision rules. The
CRMC was expected to engage in an adaptive implementation
process where pOlicy is made by those who implement it
(Robadue, 1986). Under the adaptive implementation model
policy is shaped and transformed by the people who implement
it (Wildavsky, 1979). This approach explicitly recognizes
the importance of "effective bargaining arenas."
"Bargaining, for example requires real stakes. Local
actors have no incentive for participation in a
bargaining arrangement unless the possible pay-off is
tangible and valuable ... sufficient flexibility must
exist in the outlines of a policy to allow the local
bargaining process to work. carefully specified,
hierarchically controlled, policies limit incentives
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to form strong local bargaining coalitions (Elmore,
1980) ."
These interactive dynamics contribute modification,
specification and revision in policy implementation.
outcomes are neither automatic nor assured. Regulatory
institutions must continue the search for consensus and
viable pOlicy options through adaptive implementation.
In Rhode Island the CRMC has carried out this mission.
In the fifteen years of implementation which followed
passage of the Rhode Island Coastal Resource Management law,
adaptability and change figure prominently.
The implementation of the Rhode Island Coastal Resources
Management Act consists of three stages of adaptive
behavior. The first stage took place between 1971 and 1976.
The CRMC began the process of formulating pOlicies and
obtaining legislation for its regulatory program. After
1977, in the second stage, the CRMC's jurisdiction and
mandate was more clearly defined and expanded as a result of
attempting to comply with federal requirements under Section
305 and 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act. However,
the CRMC adopted very few of the decision criteria or water
use designations required under its legislation.
In the third stage, which began in 1983, the CRMC
adopted a substantially revised, site specific regulatory
program as well as special area management plans for key
regions of the coastal zone; the deteriorating Providence
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Harbor, and the rural south shore coastal lagoons threatened
by rapid development. The CRMC is currently faced with the
serious challenge of implementing these new policies and
rules through its regulatory, enforcement, and coordinating
functions during a period of dramatically reduced financial
resources and questionable state administrative support.
CRMC Implementation, 1971-~976
In the first stage (1971-1976) the CRMC attempted to
gain legitimacy as it sought to add content to its mandate.
sophisticated planning backed by sound scientific
information was lacking during this period. The CRMC was
created because of the legal limitations faced by local
governments as they attempted to regulate environmentally
damaging activities. since Rhode Island politics has a
strong element of localism, a statewide institution was
created to do ecosystem management, but a struggle continued
with respect to the representation of local interests and
the CRMC (Robadue, 1986). The result was a state agency
with a broad mandate for statewide ecosystem management but
whose dominant orientation was local. During this time the
state sought to comply with the federal CZMA standards.
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CRMC Implementation, 1977-1982
In stage two (1977-1982) the CRMC's efforts to implement
its coastal program was given a large boost by federal
implementation section 306 grants. In the process, however,
the emphasis upon expanded jurisdiction, program approval,
and employing an environmental impact assessment approach to
decision making required by the Office of Coastal Zone
Management as a condition of funding, drove out issues and
substantive decision criteria from the regulatory process
(Robadue, 1986).
This is particularly ironic since it was federal funding
which made it possible for the CRMC to fulfill its
legislative mandate to conduct a resource oriented and
policy development process.
CBMC Implementation, 1983-1986
stage three (1983-1986) involved responding to
decreasing resources and increasing coastal development
pressures. Budgetary famine occurred as the federal
allocation was drastically reduced and state funding
remained constant or slightly declined. At the same time
the regulatory workload increased due to a boom in coastal
county housing development. The CRMC altered its operation
in light of these resource constraints. The CRMC adopted
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specific decision-rules which would permit the CRMC staff to
issue administrative assents on a variety of routine
applications. The decision to implement this part of the
legislative mandate was seen largely as a way to be more
efficient with fewer resources. The improvements to the
policy and decision process were a by-product of this
adaptive response rather than its primary goal. Practical
implementation considerations then were largely responsible
for achieving specific decision rules.
The implementation of Rhode Island's 1971 coastal
resources management act has been an adaptive process. The
unique mandate to manage ecosystems rather than specific
resources, and structural weaknesses in the law formed the
basis for a pOlicy development process which was
considerably influenced by implementation problems such as
inadequate resources, minimal federal support, increasing
coastal development and regulatory workloads, little
administrative support and resistance by the implementing
agency to the establishment of decision criteria (Robadue,
1986).
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Chapter 4 - Agency Leqitiaation Through the_courts
Through adaptive implementation the CRMC has developed
pOlicies and regulations without legislative scrutiny to
determine if the original mandate was being followed. The
CRMC chose to implement its mandate of interagency
coordination through the permit decision making process by
placing itself last in line, declaring that an applicant
must first pass all other local and state approvals. This
procedure, determined in part by the stringent Rhode Island
Administrative Procedures Act, placed the CRMC squarely as
the focal point for a series of preliminary decision making
activities by numerous agencies with only the state superior
Court to supervise its decisions.
The capability to defend these policies, regulations,
and decisions against legal challenges is a crucial
ingredient in implementing and enforcing a regulatory
program. The aggressiveness with which management agencies
pursue their mandate is influenced by a perceived strength
to withstand court scrutiny. The experience of the CRMC in
the Superior Court indicates a general pattern of success.
There are three basic types of CRMC court cases. There
are CRMC enforcement cases, which are dealt with in the
enforcement section, appeals to CRMC decisions by permit
applicants, and third party, or outside objector, appeals to
CRMC decisions.
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Appeals To Ag~ncy Decisions By Permit Applicants. 1971-1985
From 1971-1985 the CRMC denied between 5-10 percent of
their applications. It is not surprising then, that, the
CRMC has been sued just 57 times by permit applicants after
they have denied an application or modified a permit against
the wishes of the applicant.
Of the cases brought against the CRMC by applicants, 82
percent involve residential projects or are for rights-of-
way designation appeals (Figure 3). The remainder of the
cases were brought by dissatisfied commercial project
applicants. This is because approximately 70 percent of all
CRMC permits are for residential projects (CRMC Assent
file). The CRMC has lost 15 percent of the applicant cases,
won 32 percent with 53 percent still undecided by 1987.
However, 11 of the 30 undecided cases are rights-of-way
cases and 9 others have been consolidated into one future
decision on assents with stipulations for private homes.
Publiq Right-of-ways
OVer time the public access nature of some public right-
of-ways had been forgotten. In 1979 and 1980 the CRMC
searched the public records and identified thirteen existing
public right-of-ways. The town of Westerly and several
affected landowners separately sued the CRMC on various
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civil and constitutional grounds (see Town of Westerly v.
the CRMC, (R.I. Superior Ct., 81-330, 1981». A jUdicial
decision has yet to be rendered for these right-of-way
cases, with one exception.
In Pearson et.al. v. the CBMC (R.I. superior ct., 81-
702,1981) the court found for the landowner, Pearson. On
November 15, 1980 the CRMC declared a portion of the
plaintiff's property as a public right-of-way. The
plaintiff's were unable to attend the public hearing and
requested a special hearing to present their evidence to the
CRMC. The CRMC denied this request and the Pearsons sued
the CRMC claiming the CRMC decision deprived them of their
property rights without due process. The court agreed and
remanded the case to the CRMC for an additional hearing.
The eleven undecided right-of-way cases center on
constitutional legal issues regarding public v. private
property. Unless an appellant's motion to stay the CRMC
decision is granted by the Court the CRMC maintains the
position that the properties in question are public right-
of-ways (Fugate, 1988). The CRMC does not pursue the cases.
The CRMC waits for the appellant to continue the appeal
process. If, after five years, there is no activity on the
part of the appellant the CRMC files for dismissal of the
case (Fugate, 1988). These undecided appeals are
represented by the following cases.
In L. Horner. et.al. v. Lyons (R.I. Superior Ct., 81-
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510, 1981) the plaintiffs claimed their civil and
constitutional rights were violated when the CRMC designated
a public right-of-way on their property in Westerly, R.I.
The plaintiffs maintained they were never informed of any
statutes, policies, regulations, or any of the factual/legal
issues to be adjudicated at the pUblic hearings.
In R. Thurston v. the CRMC (R.I. Superior ct., 81-1385,
1981) the CRMC had designated a pUblic right-of-way for the
property adjoining the plaintiff's property. Thurston had
entered into an agreement to purchase the piece of property
on the other side of the right-of-way. He did not like the
idea of a pUblic right-of-way between his two properties.
EarlX Appeals~ 1971 - 1977
Early appeals to CRMC decisions may have been an
indicator of frustration by permit applicants to the CRMC's
lack of procedures, policies and specific decision criteria.
Between 1971 and 1977, the CRMC had to defend itself against
numerous applicant appeals. Of the 17 cases from this
period the CRMC won 53 percent, lost 18 percent with the
remaining 29 percent left undecided.
In D.P. Sherman. et.al. v. Miner (R.I. Superior ct, 74-
1890, 1974) the court found for the landowner basing its
decision on the violation of the plaintiffs constitutional
rights to private property and on a lack of evidence to
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support the CRMC's case. The plaintiff had purchased a lot
to build a house which was on a partially developed barrier
beach in Charlestown, R.I. After various ISDS tests were
approved by the Rhode Island Department of Health, Sherman
applied for a construction permit. The CRMC denied the
application, the plaintiff sued and the court ordered the
case remanded to the CRMC with instructions to grant the
application.
Another example of the CRMC's early litigation problems
is N.B. Fillmore v. Lyons (R.I. Superior ct., 73-2373,
1973). The plaintiff was granted two building permits by
the town of South Kingstown, R.I. for houses above mean high
water. One month later the CRMC issued a cease and desist
order but construction continued. The CRMC then filed a
complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court and obtained a
restraining order. Several months later the plaintiff hired
a contractor who would proceed with the construction
regardless of the restraining order. The then Rhode Island
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) served a verbal cease
and desist order, but to no effect. The DNR then served a
criminal summons to the contractor for violating Rhode
Island coastal resource laws. The plaintiffs then sued to
stop the CRMC from interfering with the construction and for
damages and attorney fees. The court restrained the CRMC
from further action in this case but denied the appeal for
monetary damages and attorney fees.
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It would be interesting to see what the pecuniary
outcome would be today given the Supreme Court's decision in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles. California, 107 S.ct. 2378 (1987)
(First Church). In First Church monetary damages were
awarded after the court determined that a temporary taking
had occurred.
Appeals _from 1978 -
An even greater number of court cases followed a few
years after the CRMC adopted its federally approved coastal
program in 1978. This was due to increased CRMC permit and
enforcement activity as a result of increased federal
implementation funds. New permit applicant appeals
increased from 10 during 1979 and 1980, to 37 during 1981
and 1982 (figure 4). During this period the CRMC won 23
percent of the 39 cases and lost 15 percent. The other 61
percent includes the bulk of the total undecided cases (80
percent) for applicant appeals.
The cases won by the CRMC during these years are
generally for small projects denied due to proximity to
tidal wetlands. Although the projects themselves were minor
the legal decisions should have given increased force to
CRMC efforts to control the cumulative effect of the minor
residential projects. Typical cases include E.W. Burdick v,
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CRMC (R.I. Superior ct., 79-3734, 1979) and G.C. Vare v.
CRMC, R.I. Superior ct., 80-1050, 1980).
In Burdick, the CRMC denied the plaintiff's application
for an ISDS on Ninigret Pond in Charlestown, R.I. They
found that the area would be exposed during a flood period
harming
nearby scallop beds and other salt marsh habitat. Plaintiff
argued that this decision was an infringement of his
constitutional private property rights but the court
affirmed the CRMC decision.
In Vare the CRMC denied an application to construct a
private dwelling near an extensive area of tidal wetland in
Narragansett, R.I. The plaintiff's arguments and the
court's ruling were the same as in Burdick.
Cases lost by the CRMC at this time were usually due to
various procedural problems including insufficient public
hearings and notification of the hearings and the issues to
be covered. W. Zanghi. et. ale v. CRMC (R.I. Superior ct.,
82-1583, 1982) typifies these cases.
The plaintiff, Zanghi, applied to the CRMC to construct
a private dwelling. The CRMC granted general approval with
whatever CRMC restrictions were deemed necessary since
Zanghi was going to sell the property as soon as a
determination was made as to whether the property was
buildable. The CRMC then denied the application due to
incomplete information as to where the dwelling would be
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placed. Zanghi applied again but the CRMC again denied the
application. Prior to the final written CRMC decision
Zanghi filed a motion to reopen the application record under
the Rhode Island Management Procedure 4.11. This would have
allowed the CRMC to reconsider CRMC staff modifications
which the staff indicated would have totally eliminated the
problems. The CRMC did not respond to this motion and
issued its final written denial. Zanghi sued and motioned
to remand the issue back to the CRMC for further
proceedings. The court found for the plaintiff and the CRMC
was required to consider and vote on the staff's modified
application.
The CRMC adopted much more specific procedures, policies
and decision criteria in 1983. Since then, there has been
only one permit applicant appeal (Appendix A). It is
possible that appeals have declined due to CRMC willingness
to grant permits more readily and with fewer modifications.
However, data from 1987 for CRMC permit application activity
shows that the CRMC is denying more applications than prior
to 1986 (CRMC Assent File, 1987).
Most of the CRMC applicant appeals have asked the Court
for reversals on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds.
However, the courts found that, as long as there were no
arbitrary environmental decisions, the enabling legislation
was constitutional and that agency decisions did not
overreach the bounds set in the legislation. Thus, CRMC
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applicant decisions have stood up fairly well in the courts.
Future CRMC success for applicant appeals will depend
primarily on the rights-of-way and consolidated case
decisions.
Appeals to Agency Decisions by Objectors to the Granting of
a Permit
with the large number of CRMC assents and low denial
rates a greater number of objector cases than those observed
would be expected. (Objectors are those who sue both the
agency and assentee for permits issued on various
environmental, riparian rights or historic preservation
reasons). There have only been 24 objector cases brought
against the CRMC. Objector cases comprise 30 percent of the
appeals to CRMC decisions.
While CRMC program changes appear to have a positive
effect on reducing permit applicant appeals they have no
effect on objector appeals to CRMC permit approvals. The
number of Objector appeals has remained consistently low
throughout the CRMC's existence.
Unlike applicant appeals 75 percent of the CRMC objector
cases dealt with more serious coastal projects. These
included cases dealing with projects affecting water
quality, impeding vessel traffic, excess of CRMC authority
concerning riparian rights, and commercial development. Of
all 16 CRMC decisions reversed and remanded by the court, 44
percent were Objector appeals to more important CRMC
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actions. In J. Saccocia. et. al, v. CBMC (R.I. Superior
ct., 75-2680, 1975) the CRMC granted a permit to J. Ginalski
to construct piers into the Warren River for boat services.
The plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the project
would cause environmental harm and impede vessel traffic.
The court ordered the case be remanded to the CRMC to take
these issues under consideration. The CRMC has not done
well when defending appeals to major permit approvals.
The CRMC has lost seven of their objector cases, winning
twelve with five still undecided. However, four of the
seven reversals came in the CRMC's first years when its
decisions were reversed because they failed to make adequate
findings of fact as required by Section 42-35-12 of the
Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act (Laverty, 1980).
In E. Greenwich Yacht Club. et. all v. CBMC (R.I. Superior
ct., 73-2852, 1973) the yacht club and Save the Bay objected
to a CRMC permit granted to the Bayside Development Corp. to
erect a high rise apartment complex in warwick, R.I. The
plaintiffs claimed the project would adversely affect the
waters of Narragansett Bay. The court remanded the case to
the CRMC for further hearings on the grounds that the CRMC
failed to make findings in fact. The original case was
brought in 1973. The decision was rendered in 1975. The
CRMC appealed the decision to the State Supreme Court in
1977. By then the Bayside Corp. had enough, dropped the
project, and ended the State Supreme Court appeal.
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One explanation proposed for these early inadequate CRMC
decisions was that the CRMC was pro-development and granted
permits without fully considering the environmental impact:
"Therefore, when decisions to issue permits were
challenged as being contrary to Council legislative
mandate, the Council could not justify its position
based on substantial evidence and related findings
of fact demonstrating that its decisions were not
essentially arbitrary and irresponsible." (Laverty,
1980)
The counter argument by the CRMC was that the lack of
technical support from the Division of Coastal Resources,
when coupled with the increasing rate of application
activity, did not allow for thorough investigation of all
applications. Thus, the CRMC was rendering decisions based
on insufficient facts. However it was the lack of specific
procedures, policies and decision criteria that precluded
satisfactory application processing. As CRMC decision
criteria developed and more and more procedures were upheld
in court Objector cases subsided. Of the 24 objector cases
54 percent were in the early period from 1971-1977, 37
percent from 1978-1982, and only 8 percent after the CRMC
adopted more specific decision criteria and procedures. The
CRMC has not lost an Objector case since 1975.
There have been very few appeals to CRMC decisions
despite the length of time the agency has existed and the
number of applications processed. CRMC regulations and
decisions for less important applicant cases have been
upheld by the courts. In recent state Supreme Court cases
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the CRMCs legality was not challenged in the CRMC's decision
concerning Easton's Beach and an order to remove docks in
front of the Wellington Hotel upheld. By increasing the
degree of specificity of its policies, regulations, and
decision criteria the CRMC seems to have reduced applicant
challenges to a low level in recent years. Generally, the
courts have found the CRMC accountable for the Rhode Island
coastal resource management laws and regulations and upheld
the CRMC's implementation and enforcement of the RICRMP.
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Chapter ? - CBMC Enforce.ent Efforts
The CRMC issues permits to regulate coastal activity and
to protect Rhode Island's marine environment. Despite the
broad goals listed earlier the CRMC has directed its
permitting behavior toward minor residential projects. Of
the 3543 assents issued by the CRMC from 1971 - 1985
approximately 70% were for five types of minor projects and
an estimated 95% of all applications for CRMC permits were
approved (CRMC assent file). Recent permit data from 1986-
1988 shows applications are substantially higher than
approvals on a monthly and annual basis. Many applications
are dropped or not completed. It is unclear if this is a
recent phenomenon or that the CRMC's new computer permit
tracking system is compiling a more accurate record.
However, it appears that the CRMC has been regulating
private homeowners who are rarely denied permits. These
minor projects include single family dwelling units,
residential accessory structures, residential piers, and
individual sewage disposal systems.
Prior to late 1986 cease and desist orders were issued
when a violation of a permit or of the regulations was
reported to the CRMC by either private citizens, town
officials but most often by the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management (OEM) enforcement staff, which
supports the CRMC. Cease and desist orders were also issued
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when a permit is violated and discovered by the CRMC staff.
In a hierarchy of enforcement actions this notification
would normally be seen as the first step. In Hawkins'
compliance strategy negotiation toward voluntary compliance
would follow progressing to more formal legal sanctions if
negotiations fail (Hawkins, 1984). However, the CRMC
preferred to have a written record of every detected
violation. The cease and desist order was thus formal
notification and a stop-work-order calling for either
restoration or that the violator apply for a CRMC permit.
The CRMC has preferred to work with the violator on a
conciliatory basis but in many cases that is not possible
for two reasons: (1) there is little or no follow up on
cease and desist orders due to manpower shortages; and (2)
violators blatantly ignore the orders continuing their
project either because they are naturally antagonistic
toward governmental interference or are aware of CRMC
enforcement ineffectiveness and do not worry about formal
legal sanctions rarely used by the CRMC. There are those
who initially follow the rules but become discouraged when
no action is taken on their application.
Major and Minor Violations
On a case-by-case basis many of the violations are
considered minor (Pisani, 1987). Since 70% of the CRMC's
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workload is processing minor residential project
applications this is not surprising. However, these
detected minor violations have over time probably had a
negative cumulative impact on Rhode Island's coastal
resources. Added to this are the detected major violations
and those violations not detected. The negative impact of
the violations is further evident because there has been a
high level of non-compliance with the detected violations
(see Chapter 5). Thus, not only are the resources impacted,
but the CRMC has been unable to effectively carry out its
enforcement responsibilities.
It is difficult to determine the severity of the
detected violations. Unless the CRMC followed-up on a case
there was no further CRMC record of the violations outcomes.
The CRMC staff assert that half of the cease and desist
orders from 1973 - 1986 were for minor wetland fill
violations (Pisani, 1987). When the cease and desist orders
were issued the illegal action often ceased but no further
action was taken, either by the violator or the CRMC. Years
later the landowner might apply for a permit to place a
structure on the fill. The CRMC is then unable to determine
if there was a violation because the illegal fill has
revegetated and become part of the site. This enforcement
failure increases the cumulative impact of the minor illegal
fills.
other times the cease and desist orders were ignored,
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the illegal activity continued and there was no further
record of CRMC enforcement action. For example, in 1981 the
CRMC issued a cease and desist order to the Newport
Shipyard, Inc. to stop illegal filling and remove the fill
which had been placed below mean high water. Two months
later the CRMC discovered that the illegal fill had been
paved over and another cease and desist order was issued.
That was the last action taken and CRMC staffers do not know
if corrective action was taken (Pisani, 1987). The large
number of unresolved, probably minor, violations and the
incomplete CRMC records draws attention to the limited
ability of the CRMC to enforce the Rhode Island coastal
management regulations and the limited mandate the CRMC has
made for itself from their enabling legislation. The
following sections discuss the reasons the CRMC was not
successful in enforcing the RICRMP prior to late 1986.
Effects of Funding on Enforcement
Funding levels play a key role in CRMC enforcement
efforts. Funding provides the resources needed to formulate
the policies, regulations and procedures to implement the
coastal program's goals. The CRMC's use of cease and desist
orders and other informal enforcement mechanisms, i.e.,
staff vigilance, CRMC members and citizen complaints, and
follow-up on these orders was tightly coupled to funding and
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personnel levels and not to potential violations due to CRMC
permits or levels of coastal development activity. The
state of Rhode Island created a new entity to deal with
their coastal management concerns but was unwilling to
provide the support to carry out the CRMCs mandate.
Prior to 1977 funding for the Rhode Island coastal
program was low. Most of the available resources were used
to implement the 1971 mandate to prepare plans and
regulations. In 1978 the Rhode Island program received
federal approval. However, federal funding steadily
decreased from $1,670,000 in 1978 to $285,966 in 1983 (1986
dollars). In 1983 the CRMC adopted sweeping amendments to
its statewide regulatory program in part to compensate for
loss in resources by approving more specific decision
criteria, water and shore use designations, prohibited uses
and special area management plans. However, these specific
criteria did little to improve the enforcement efforts of
the CRMC.
The decline in program funding has had a major adverse
effect on enforcement of coastal program rules and
regulations. The CRMC has issued a total of 431 cease and
desist orders from 1973-1985. Available data suggests that
the fluctuation in enforcement activity is closely linked to
funding levels, manpower and the initiation of new programs.
There is a negative relationship between enforcement
activity and coastal development (figures 5 and 6).
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Figure 6
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Enforcement was very low in the early years of the CRMC, but
steadily increased at the same time that the development
rate was dropping to a historic low in 1982 (figure 6).
CRMC enforcement efforts then fell sharply just as the Rhode
Island economy recovered and building in coastal
municipalities began a rapid rise. When increased
permitting and enforcement measures were needed the CRMC was
without the resources and political will to increase the
detected violations.
Finally, CRMC enforcement can be shown to follow closely
the Rhode Island coastal program long term funding cycle
(figures 5 and 7). Enforcement peaked shortly after funding
peaked in 1978-1980. Following the decrease in federal and
state funds enforcement activity also decreased.
The dramatic increase in cease and desist orders in 1985
was not due to an increase in the detection of violations
but because one enforcement administrator was hired by the
CRMC to issue long ,overdue orders (Seavey, 1987). However,
this enforcement official notes that the 90 orders issued in
1985 were a "drop in the bucket" and that many more could be
issued. They were not issued due to lack of time and
resources and the inability of the CRMC, DEM and CRMC's
legal counsel to follow up even for the orders issued.
Indeed, from January to October of 1986 the CRMC issued
only 30-35 cease and desist orders, down from 90 in 1985,
because the one CRMC enforcement administrator had to take
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over other administrative responsibilities. since then,
another enforcement administrator was hired who was
subsequently let go when the former enforcement
administrator had to resume his former duties.
Management Problems and Enforcement
The Rhode Island coastal program has constantly been
plagued with a personnel problem. There have been too few
staff members to efficiently issue administrative assents in
a timely manner, follow up on known violations and cease and
desist orders, and increase the detection of violations.
In the CRMC's early years, 1971-1973, the CRMC's staff
support was provided by the forerunner of the OEM, the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Because of disputes
between the CRMC chairman, Dr. Vincent Oddo; DNR Director,
Edward Hayes; and DNR chief of the Division of Planning and
Development, Calvin Dunwoody; no working relationship could
be established between the CRMC and the DNR (Laverty, 1980).
The CRMC lacked the staff support for application processing
and enforcement. At one point the CRMC complained it could
not even get a letter typed and that the DNR told the CRMC
it should do its own enforcement (Laverty, 1980).
The CRMC lacked either the leadership and/or the
understanding to attempt to move ahead with its own
enforcement or enlist the aid of the state administration or
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legislature. If the CRMC had been serious about coastal
management an increased enforcement effort would have been
expected. However, the state appeared to have forgotten the
CRMC. The General Assembly had dealt with the initial
problem by creating the CRMC and was not interested or aware
of the implementation problems. The issue of coastal
management was no longer on the state "agenda" and the CRMC
proceeded in an "adaptive implementation" mode.
The scattering of regulatory, planning and
administrative responsibilities among several agencies also
set the stage for conflicts and discontinuities in
leadership (Laverty, 1980). Examples of this include the
continual shifting of responsibility for grant supervision
among agencies and the dispersal of permit processing staff
among various divisions of the Department of Environment
Management.
Much of the increased enforcement funding in 1979 went
to OEM to conduct an improved program to, "ensure compliance
with coastal laws, regulations, permit conditions and CRMC
cease and desist orders" (CZMA section 312 review, 1979).
These efforts resulted in over 500 reported violations of
shellfish, lobster, shellfish pollution, barrier beach and
other regulations. The 1979 312 review incorrectly credited
the OEM and the R.I. Fish and Game enforcement to the CRMC
pointing out that, "•.. 95% of these 500 cases resulted in
guilty verdicts and payment of fines levied by the courts.
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Enforcement personnel also inspect the progress of CRMC
permitted activities and ensure compliance with cease and
desist orders (CZMA section 312 Review, 1979)."
However, there were no CRMC enforcement court cases in
1979 and there has never been a fine levied by the court for
a violation of a CRMC order. Thus, at least 475 of these
cases had nothing to do with CRMC enforcement. What the
federal review failed to recognize was, that, the federal
funds allocated to increase the enforcement of the RICRMP
were used to enforce the DEM's mandate. The CRMC should
have been enforcing its efforts to control coastal
development. This review actually illustrated the
ineffective and uncoordinated efforts by the CRMC, DEM, and
the federal government to improve RICRMP enforcement
efforts. This is a clear indication that the enforcement
efforts of the late 1970's did not provide much support to
the coastal program. Even when some enforcement action was
taken, compliance did not necessarily follow. For example,
the section 312 review from 1982 noted that,
"The staff increased its efforts to identify those
situations on non-compliance to avert potentially
damaging conditions prior to their development. These
activities revealed a rather consistent lack of
compliance with stipulations imposed upon authorized
projects. Many of the violations recorded during the
review period reflected situations where imposed
conditions were ignored or not carried through
properly" (CZMA 312 review, 1982).
The 312 reviews show that when increased enforcement
efforts were made the number of detected violations rose
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dramatically. Figure 8 shows this increased non-compliance
during 1979-1981 and again in 1985 when the number of cease
and desist orders per assents issued rose significantly. In
1979 and 1980 there were 20 cease and desist orders issued
for every 100 permits granted. This number increased to 28
cease and desist orders/lOa permits in 1985. This ratio is
probably significantly higher due to undetected violations.
What makes this enforcement ineffectiveness more apparent
is, that, even during those times of increased detection
there was still inadequate follow-up and thus the cease and
desist orders went largely unenforced. The CRMC was wasting
scarce resources to increase detection of, without securing
compliance, the violations.
The CRMC has experienced great difficulty in operating a
consistent and effective enforcement program. Enforcement
of Rhode Island's coastal regulations has been hindered by
weak staffing, variable funding, heavy reliance on cease and
desist orders which usually receive no follow-up, thus
diminishing the reasons for increasing enforcement efforts,
and a complex regulatory program that imposes many
stipulations on individual permits without a good
enforcement information system. To determine exactly how
successful CRMC enforcement efforts have been the next
section will examine the CRMC compliance process and actual
levels of compliance with cease and desist orders.
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Chapter 6 - CBMC Regulatory COMpliance Process
Compliance in any regulatory or enforcement system must
be examined from two sides. The first is the regulatory
framework which creates incentives designed to encourage
compliance (Young, 1979). The second is the individuals
response to the regulatory system. Young notes that these
systems are variations on three forms:
(1) Punishments or rewards.
(2) Inspection systems designed to reduce the probability of
subjects engaging in undetected violations.
(3) Burdening subjects by keeping public records of past
violations.
Public authorities choose among these mechanisms to
determine the optimal mix which will most likely deal with
future compliance problems (Young, 1979). Constraining
these decisions are bUdgetary and manpower limitations,
political and administrative will.
These choices are determined by how much compliant
behavior the institutions are interested in eliciting in
environmental regulation and the resources available. The
choices must then be evaluated by what impact the compliance
mechanisms are actually having on the environment. If there
is a strong environmental mandate but little political or
administrative initiative is success measured by the
original legislative mandate or by what the regulatory
institution is willing or able to implement? If we assume
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agency/program legitimacy and that something is better than
nothing in environmental protection, then we must analyze
compliance mechanisms in light of what is available, in
terms of funding, manpower, etc., and not the ideal of the
enabling legislation. We must also look for mis-management
or a lack of political and/or administrative will even when
there is adequate resources.
A compliance system also includes an individual's choice
to comply with or violate the regulations. Young, Becker
and stigler all point out that enforcement systems attempt
to influence individual cost-benefit calculations.
Therefore, "it is important to identify the variables that
the subject will take into account in computing the expected
value of violation." (Young, 1979).
The implied probabilities that an individual weighs are:
(1) The probability of violating without detection.
(2) The benefits associated with undetected activities
(3) The probability of being detected but avoiding
sanctions.
(4) The benefits associated with being detected but avoiding
sanctions.
(5) The probability of being detected and sanctioned and the
associated costs.
After determining the probable costs of violation, the
individual will, consciously or sub-consciously, weigh the
expected value of violation with the expected value of
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compliance, choosing to comply only if the probability of
detection exceeds compliance (Becker, 1968, stigler, 1970).
Therefore, the regulatory body should minimize the
probability of undetected violations and insure some level
of sanctions will follow every violation (stigler, 1970).
Coastal resource management enforcement actions need to be
periodically followed up, at least when sanctions are
minimal. The CRMC is seriously lacking in this capability.
Becker, Tullock, et.al., stress that the probability of
being sanctioned is a greater deterrent than the size of
sanctions (Becker, 1968 and Tullock, 1974). Often times a
violator simply makes large fines a cost of doing business
using the courts to prolong the "pain" associated with
immediate payment (Matera, 1986, et.al.). The sanctions
would need to be marginally more than the benefits of
violation. This would insure quicker payment and still
cause more "pain" to the violator. However, the CRMC has
not appeared to affect any individuals expected probability
of sanctions, large or small. There has been no threat of
sanctions when violators have been detected by the CRMC.
The CRMC could probably have elicited greater compliance by
sanctioning even a few violators because individuals make
choices about compliance in an essentially self-interested
fashion (Frohlich, 1974). The level of compliance will drop
when violators estimate how many others are violating the
same regulations at the same time (Young 1979). This
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reduces the chances of being caught in an enforcement system
that does not increase its monitoring capabilities.
How then do public authorities bring about compliance?
Young points out that compliance is pursued using two
methods, inducement and enforcement (Young, 1979).
Enforcement consists of systems associated with the use of
punishments. Inducement, on the other hand, seeks to
increase the individual's expected value of compliance
rather than to reduce the expected value of violation
(Young, 1979). That is, point out the overall good to
society, the environment, and the individual, and possibly
reward compliance in some fashion. Hawkins uses the same
"carrot and stick" approach when he talks about conciliatory
methods and sanctions in environmental enforcement (Hawkins,
1984) .
Hawkins' compliance strategy relies on bargaining to
"prevent a harm rather than punish an evil" (Hawkins, 1984).
This conciliatory approach seeks to do what is necessary to
remedy a bad situation rather than the all or nothing -
punishment or acquittal formal approach of the sanction
strategy (Black, 1976). Regulatory agencies employ the
compliance strategy when violations provide for the
development of social interaction between agency officials
and the regulated (Hawkins, 1984).
This style of enforcement has a more positive effect in
environmental regulation than the sanctioning strategy
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because the coastal zone agencies ideally would prefer to
rationally develop and conserve resources, not prosecute
landowners after ecological damage has been done (McAdam,
1983). Working effectively with developers, within the
regulations, promotes a greater willingness on the part of
the developers to cooperate with, and not fight with the
agency (Hawkins, 1984). However, Hawkins points out that
the conciliatory method of enforcement should incorporate
elements of the sanctioning strategy, such as, imposing
penalties when violators are unwilling to negotiate with the
agencies as a deterrent effect. The enforcement of
environmental regulations incorporates elements of both
compliance and sanctioning strategies. Unfortunately, the
CRMC does not back-up its bargaining with sanctions or
follow-up on enforcement efforts.
Initially, some regulatory violations are dealt with by
a formal style of enforcement and at other times
conciliatory methods will yield to sanctioning if the
struggle for conformity is lost. However, since those who
are regulated have either good economic or social reasons
not to comply with environmental regulation, compliance is
not always secured given the "frailty" of the formal legal
process and its limited usage (Hawkins, 1984).
Hawkins notes that, "in enforcement of regulation, a
distinct aversion is noticeable to sanctioning rule-breaking
with punishment ••. writers have observed a style of
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enforcement which seems to be predominantly conciliatory.
Some, as a result, have complained that regulations are
poorly enforced and legislation is ineffective, or that a
tradition of relatively weak enforcement prevails (Hawkins,
1984)." Hawkins suggests that a crucial part of this
problem is the ambivalence of environmental regulatory
agencies because their authority is not "secured on a
perceived moral and political consensus about the ills they
seek to control. Police, in comparison, enjoy a relatively
secure moral mandate .•• the lack of a moral mandate threatens
the agency's legitimacy as an enforcement authority
(Hawkins, 1984)."
However, Young points out, that, in the long run it may
be more efficient to "pursue compliance through methods of
altering incentive systems other than those associated with
the use of rewards and punishments" (Young 1979). However,
bringing about effective habits of compliance through
socialization may take several generations (Young 1979). In
terms of some environmental problems, this may be too late.
Thus, the public authorities have a dilemma as to what
mix ot enforcement schemes they can utilize effectively to
secure some level of compliance. until very recently there
was an unwillingness by the CRMC to improve enforcement and
to sanction violators. The level of non-compliance will
determine whether the CRMC can continue to function in an
effective manner.
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Compliance with the Rhode Island coastal resource
management regulations is dependant upon the number of
violations detected and the outcome of those violations
(figure 9). The flow of violations starts with the coastal
activities subject to the regulations (figure 9). In this
scheme some individuals subject to regulation follow the law
and apply for a permit. others violate the regulations, are
detected and are issued a cease and desist order. Then
there are those who violate the regulations and are not
detected.
Applications for a permit are either denied or approved.
In either case there may be detected or undetected
violations. Those who are denied a permit may proceed with
their project anyway. Those who are issued a permit may not
adhere to the permit stipulations.
Prior to late 1986, when a violation was detected a
violator was either ordered to apply to the CRMC for a
permit or to restore the damage. These orders were either
complied with, not complied with or there was no CRMC
follow-up and it was unclear whether there was compliance.
Those that were ordered to apply for a permit and complied
went back through the system. Again, these may either be
denied or approved. As figure 9 shows these may lead to
further violations and non-compliance.
When non-compliance of cease and desist orders is
detected and the CRMC takes legal action four outcomes are
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Figure 9
The Plow of Violations in the Rhode Island CRMC
Enforceaent system
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possible:
(1) The CRMC may win but the case is remanded to the CRMC
for the permitting process. Figure 9 demonstrates that this
does not necessarily assure compliance because the process
starts over again.
(2) If the CRMC were to lose an enforcement case the
activity in question would be assumed to be legal and would
be in compliance.
(3) Some cases are still undecided.
(4) If the CRMC wins the case outright there is no
permitting recourse and the violator is ordered to comply
with the CRMC Restoration order. However, this may not be
complied with and the violation goes through the system
again.
The information available to evaluate the CRMC
enforcement and regulatory efforts as identified in figure
10 are:
(1) The permits issued by year from 1971 to the present.
These permits may be broken down into one of thirty project
types: by town, by waterbody and whether the permit was
issued by the CRMC support staff (Administrative permits) or
by a full Council vote.
The level of full Council permits has remained fairly
constant through the years at around 100/year (figure 11).
Initially, the council issued approximately eighty percent
of the permits (figure 12). As the CRMC increased its
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Figure 10
INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATING
RHODE ISLAND CRMC ENFORCEMENT/REGULATORY
ACTIVITIES
PERMITS APPROVED BY YEAR, 1971 - 1986.
* BY PROJECT TYPE
* BY TOWN
* BY WATERBODY
* ADMINISTRATIVE OR FULL COUNCIL PERMIT
TOTAL VIOLATIONS DETECTED (CEASE' DESIST ORDERS),
1971 - 1986.
LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE WITH DETECTED VIOLATIONS, 1980 -
1985. SAMPLE OF A 30t/YEAR OR 90 OUT OF 300 TOTAL FOR
THE SIX YEARS.
* DETECTED VIOLATIONS OF PmufiTS
* DETECTED VIOLATIONS OF REGUlATIONS
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79
Fi gure 11
Rhode Island CRMC Permits
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Fi gure 12'
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permitting ability the percentage of full Council permits
has dropped to where the CRMC staff is now handling roughly
seventy percent of the permits.
(2) The total violations detected from 1971 - 1986. There
were approximately 466 cease and desist orders issued by the
CRMC during this time. However, due to insufficient CRMC
cease and desist order records prior to 1980 and from 1985
to1987 CRMC enforcement analysis will focus on violations
that occurred from 1980 - 1985. Enforcement efforts stalled
in 1986 due to a CRMC reorganization.
(3) The levels of compliance with detected violations
from 1980 - 1985. Of the 300 violations from 1980 - 1985 a
random sample of thirty percent was taken for each year.
These 90 violations fall into three main categories:
compliance, non-compliance and unclear (figure 13). Initial
investigations showed that forty-four percent of the cease
and desist orders were complied with, forty-four percent
were not and twelve percent were unclear. These percentages
were acquired through CRMC staff interviews and by examining
the CRMC records. Unclear violations were never followed
up, there was no subsequent application and no further
record kept by the CRMC after the initial cease and desist
order was issued.
Some ot the violations the CRMC maintained were complied
with were eliminated from further investigation because
permits had been issued for the work done (after-the-fact
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Figure 13
Disposition of a 30' Sample of
Rhode Island CRMC Cease and Desist
orders, 1980 - 1985 by Year (')
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 Total
compliance 7(47) 7 (35) 5 (56) 4(40) 5(63) 9(35) 37(41)
Non- 9(53) 13(65) 4(44) 6(60) 3 (38) 15(58) 50(56)
Coapliance
Unclear (no 1( 6) o( 0) o( 0) o( 0) o( 0) 2 ( 8) 3( 3)
application,
no follow up)
Total 17(100) 20(100) 9(100) 10(100) 8(100) 26(100) 90(100)
Source: Kaiser, 1988 (unpublished)
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permits). However, following field checks of eleven unclear
violations and eighteen of the violations that were
considered in compliance, it was discovered that five of the
eleven unclear violations and six of the eighteen complied
violations were actually not in compliance. In reality,
only forty-one percent of the sample were in compliance,
fifty-six percent were not in compliance and three percent
were still unclear (figure 13). The remaining unclear three
percent includes one from those that were originally unclear
and two from those that were originally thought to be in
compliance.
The fifty-six percent non-compliance is significant.
Having over half of the detected violations in non-
compliance is unacceptable. Not realizing that violations
thought to be in compliance were not demonstrates the
inability of the CRMC to enforce the coastal regulations
and the complacency that existed in the implementation of
the RICRMP.
The levels of compliance with detected violations can be
broken down further into the following three areas of
violations:
(1) Violation of the regulations where the violator is
ordered to apply for a permit;
(2) Violation of the regulations where the violator is
ordered to restore the damaged area to its original
condition; and,
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(3) Violation of an existing permit.
sixty percent of the sampled violations are for
violations of the regulations where the violator is ordered
to apply for a permit. Thirty-two percent are for violation
of the regulations/ restoration order and eight percent are
for violation of a permit (figure 14).
Although violations of permits are only eight percent of
the total sample seventy-one percent of these violations are
complied with (figure 15). This may be because permits are
easier or more likely to be followed up by CRMC staff than
detecting violations of the RICRMP.
Those who were caught violating the regulations and
ordered to apply for a permit were not as apt to adhere to
the cease and desist orders. There was a 50% non-compliance
of the orders in these cases. However, once an application
was made there was often no further action taken (Pisani,
1987). The CRMC may deny the application or wait for
further information before rendering a decision. It is
often not clear to the CRMC what happens to these cases.
Thus, the level of compliance may actually be lower than 46%
for these cases.
Perhaps most significant is the seventy-two percent of
non-compliance for restoration orders. These tend to be the
more important environmental violations where the violator
has no alternative other than returning the affected area to
its original state. The 72% non-compliance demonstrates
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Figure 14
Distribution of a 30' sample of
Rhode Island CRMC Cease and Desist
Orders, 1980 - 1985 by Violation Area and Year (')
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 Total
(1) Violation of 12 (71) 12(60) 7 (78) 6(60) 6(75) 11 (42) 54(60)
Rec;ulations
(apply for permit)
(2) Violation of 4(24) 6 (30) 1 (11) 3(30) 2 (25) 13(50) 29(32)
Rec;ulations
(order to restore)
(3) Violation of 1 ( 5) 2(10) 1 (11) 1(10) o( 0) 2 ( 8) 7 ( 8)
Permit
Total 17(100) 20(100) 9(100) 10(100) 8(100) 26(100) 90(100)
Source: Kaiser, 1988 (unpublished)
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Figure 15
Disposition of a 30\ Sample of
Rhode Island CRMC Cease and Desist
Orders, 1980 - 1985 by Violation Area (\)
(1)
Violation of
Regulations
Violation Area (apply for permit)
Compliance 25 (46)
Non-compliance 27 (50)
Unclear 2 ( 4)
Total 54 (100)
Source: Kaiser, 1988 (unpublished)
(2)
Violation of
Regulations
(order to restore)
7 (24)
21 (72)
1 ( 4)
29 (100)
(3)
Violation
of
Permit Total
5 (71) 37 (41)
2 (29) 50(56)
o ( 0) 3 ( 3)
7 (100) 90(100)
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that there was little incentive to comply with the
restoration orders. This may be because it is usually
expensive to restore an affected area and violators may have
believed there was little probability of further CRMC
action.
In all of these cases, if the pUblic perceives that
there is little chance of further enforcement action,
following a cease and desist order, they may proceed with
the illegal activity or stop but not repair the damage.
(4) The CRMC funding levels. Funding levels playa key
role in CRMC enforcement efforts. Funding provides the
resources needed to formulate the policies, regulations and
procedures to implement the coastal program's goals. The
CRMC's use of cease and desist orders and follow-up on these
orders is tightly coupled to funding and personnel levels
(see previous enforcement section).
(5) The formal legal process is the last enforcement
action for non-compliance of cease and desist orders. This
includes the use of fines which may be issued after
conviction. However, to date these fines have not been
used. Administrative fines would be a most useful tool for
violations of the regulations and/or a cease and desist
order.
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The Formal Legal Process
The Chairman of the CRMC, at the direction of the
Council, may seek judicial relief whenever such action is
necessary for CRMC performance, or CRMC orders are not
complied with. The Superior court has the jurisdiction to
enforce CRMC decisions. In the early 1970s cases were
prosecuted by the Attorney General in the name of the CRMC
(Chapter 23, section 3, Subsection 46-23-7 (1) (b) of the
General Laws of Rhode Island). However, the CRMC eventually
utilized the firm of Goldman, Biafore and Hines when
prosecuting violators. According to the Director of the
CRMC, this was due to. the inability of the Attorney
General's Office to fulfill its responsibilities because of
staff limitations (Fugate, 1988).
Of the approximately 3500 assents issued by the CRMC
from 1971-1986 there have been 431 cease and desist orders
but only 15 instances where the CRMC prosecuted a violator.
While this low number could reflect a high compliance rate
to CRMC cease and desist orders and regulations this has not
been the case. The low probability of prosecution is due to
little or no follow up on cease and desist orders and the
unwillingness or inability of the CRMC and Attorney General
to prosecute. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the
cease and desist orders were ignored.
When the CRMC does prosecute it has been successful.
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They have won thirteen of the fifteen superior court cases.
Eight of these were remanded back to the CRMC for the
permitting process. The other two cases are still
undecided.
Thirteen of the cases were for non-compliance of a cease
and desist order. The remaining two are for similar
violations but with no cease and desist order issued. The
cases dealt with residential construction on barrier
beaches/tidal areas and filling tidal areas without a permit
and construction/ filling beyond the terms of a permit. Ten
of the cases were for violations of non-permitted activities
and five for violations of CRMC permits. One case was for
the removal of a grounded barge in coastal waters.
Typical cases include Lyons v. G. Pontes. et.al. (R.I.
Superior ct., 81-2902, 1981) where the CRMC prosecuted Quito
Shellfish, Co. for placing various types of debris,
including fill rock, into coastal waters without a permit
since the summer of 1980. The CRMC issued various cease and
desist orders in the spring of 1981 to remove the debris
which had become a hazard to the environment and to
navigation. The defendant refused to comply and continued
to fill. The case then went to court and the defendant
admitted to unloading fish debris from two of its boats at
the state dock in Jerusalem, R.I. but denied placing the
fill rock material there. The court found otherwise and
held that the defendant must remove all the debris or pay
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the state to remove it and never dump again.
Another enforcement case initiated in 1981 was Lyons v.
J. Gencarella. et. ale (R.I. Superior ct., 81-2454, 1981).
In April, 1980 the CRMC gave the defendant permission to
fill a 30 x 30 foot area of his property on a barrier beach
at Ninigret Pond. The defendant filled far more than
stipulated and altered and destroyed the coastal
environment. In October of 1980 the CRMC issued a
restoration order which the defendant refused to obey. In
July of 1981 the CRMC subpoenaed Gencarella. The defendant
claimed that the CRMC gave permission to fill his entire
property. One year later the court ordered the defendant to
eliminate the sedimentation and runoff occurring, as a
result of the illegal filling, at the direction of the CRMC.
The defendant was restrained from further filling and the
case was remanded to the CRMC to determine the effects of
the filling on the coastal resources. One year later the
defendant was found in contempt for not taking the ordered
steps.
Enforcement is a crucial element of coastal zone
management. The Rhode Island CRMC has employed an approach
which seeks to obtain compliance through negotiation rather
than sanctions. However, formal sanctions were rarely used
by Rhode Island to back-up failed negotiations or ignored
cease and desist orders.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions
with limited resources the CRMC must determine what
level of compliance will be acceptable or is desired. There
must then be a determination as to whether the desired or
selected level of compliance is adequate to fulfill the
goals of the regulatory program. The agency must then
decide what mix of compliance mechanisms will best utilize
the scarce resources to attain the selected level of
compliance.
The mechanisms the CRMC has employed to secure
compliance to the regulations have not been effective.
While it is unclear as to the level of compliance with
permits, there is the same lack of resources and monitoring
with permits as there is with cease and desist orders. The
state should commit additional resources for increased staff
and enforcement needs. There should be increased monitoring
of the coastal zone for undetected violations and follow-up
on permits and detected violations. This study has shown
that when the CRMC employed its enforcement mechanisms they
only reached a 41% compliance rate for detected violations
(see Appendix B - statistical Analysis - for extrapolation
of the sample to all cease and desist orders). Is this an
acceptable level of compliance? The answer is, no, for
several reasons.
First, the CRMC has a mandate to manage many coastal
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activities. The mandate called for the " ... preservation and
restoration of ecological systems ... " Yet, for the most
part, it was involved in relatively minor permitting
activities which they could not enforce.
Secondly, the CRMC has not been aware of the actual
levels of compliance. The cease and desist order data shows
that violations thought to be in compliance were not and the
CRMC files and interviews with staff show that there are
many cases they know nothing about. Presumably, this could
be the case with permits as well.
Third, the federal coastal managers pointed out, in
several 312 evaluations, that, there was an enforcement
problem that needed to be addressed. The OCRM has the
ability to bring state programs into compliance with the
evaluations through Special Award Conditions and Significant
Improvement Tasks. This has not been done. It was not
until the 1986 312 evaluation that the federal government
recommended that,
liThe CRMC, in consultation with the Governor's Office,
should assess the steps necessary to insure that coastal
projects conform with the specific policies of the
RICRMP and the stipulations of CRMC assents. At the
very least, the CRMC should begin to exercise its
authority to issue subpoenas to violators who have not
complied with Cease and Desist orders as a means of
bringing them before the full CRMC to discuss possible
resolutions before legal action is taken."
The document also reports that the OCRM will closely
monitor CRMC's enforcement actions and that the CRMC needs
to report quarterly on all outstanding violations. The CRMC
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has not reported on the outstanding violations (Cousins,
1988). The CRMC turned its efforts toward new violations
but only reported on these for one quarter (Cousins, 1988).
The CRMC has not enforced its regulatory
responsibilities well. This has been due to administrative
problems, both within the CRMC and between the CRMC and
other state agencies: insufficient staff and resources,
particularly from the state since federal funds are limited
and vary year to year: and minimal federal oversight and
pressure to correct the problems.
Recently, the CRMC alleges that it has improved its
enforcement capabilities. This has been due in part to the
work done by Hennessey and Robadue (Robadue, 1986) and the
information gathered and used for this report (Kaiser,
1986) •
When a violation is detected now, the CRMC issues a
Notice of Violation (NOV). The CRMC asserts that most
violations are cleared through the NOVs (Fugate, 1988). If
compliance is not secured within 20 days a cease and desist
order is issued which is attached to the property's title.
This has now become fairly routine (Fugate, 1988). If there
is still non-compliance the violator is subpoenaed before
the CRMC council. If this is ineffective then formal legal
action will be taken.
From May 1988 through October 1988, the CRMC has
subpoenaed approximately five individuals. Four of the
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individuals complied by applying for an application while
legal action is being taken against one.
In addition, the CRMC has started to impose
administrative fees for after-the-fact permits. Fees are
assessed for the extra CRMC staff time needed for mitigation
planning as a result of the unpermitted activity. There is
no limit set on these fees. The permit is then attached to
the title of the property with a clause that states that the
violator admits to the violation, agrees to a CRMC
mitigation plan, agrees to the fee imposed and agrees to the
penalty that will be imposed if there is still non-
compliance (Fugate, 1988).
The CRMC has also begun issuing specific restoration
orders. When a restoration order is issued a site visit is
made to determine what is necessary and a plan is then drawn
up by the CRMC (Fugate, 1988).
The CRMC asserts that these actions and a better
relationship with the Rhode Island's Attorney General's
Office have been effective in securing a greater level of
compliance to detected violations. However, there needs to
be a greater use of the subpoena power of the CRMC for
unresolved violations. In addition, sufficient resources
need to be provided by either the Governor's office or the
CRMC to the Attorney General's office for processing civil
and criminal court actions involving coastal management
actions. The CRMC could hire a paralegal for handling
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enforcement and legal issues, and preparing Attorney General
cases, etc.
It is too early to measure the success of these new
initiatives. Compliance was previously assumed in cases
which were actually not in compliance. Certainly, these
measures are a step in the right direction.
However, to secure a higher level of compliance the CRMC
and the state need to take additional measures that include:
formalized letters for permits and violations that include
the location of the project, a detailed description of the
projects location on the property, the plat and lot numbers,
town, street address, waterway, and CRMC file number;
specific forms that the CRMC must issue to remove a cease
and desist order, for project monitoring, and for permit
compliance; site inspections by enforcement personnel made
in a timely manner once a permit application has received an
assent or denial; development of a computer tracking system
which will interface with the permit tracking system;
strengthening the penalty provisions of the CRMC statute;
and administrative fines issued by the CRMC. In addition,
the state should develop a far reaching educational program
to alert Rhode Island citizens of environmental dangers
caused by illegal development. There should also be an
effort to educate the legal community of the ramifications
of various legal decisions on the ability of the CRMC to
implement an effective coastal resource management program.
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Another way for the CRMC to improve its enforcement
capabilities with limited resources is to develop a training
program for local building inspectors. The inspectors are
already in the field, are familiar with their areas, and
already have the expertise to issue minor CRMC permits and
to enforce the RICRMP regulations since many of the permits
issued by the CRMC are for small residential projects. To
implement these new initiatives, increase the level of
compliance, and decrease the suspected levels of undetected
violations new state resources and political commitment will
be needed to further the effectiveness of CRMC enforcement
activities.
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Appendix B - statistical Analysis
The level of compliance with CRMC cease and desist
orders was deemed a reasonable measure of the agency's
enforcement efforts. It would also have been useful to
determine the level of compliance with CRMC permits.
However, ~his would have required a large sample and time
and resources that were not available. This was discussed
with the thesis committee and Don Robadue of the Coastal
Resources Center. All agreed that an indepth analysis of
the cease and desist orders would be sufficient.
The cease and desist orders issued from 1980 - 1985 were
chosen for two reasons:
(1) CRMC records become very incomplete and untraceable
prior to 1980. From 1980 - 1985 the records were in
sufficient enough shape to follow through the system, with
field checks. After 1985 enforcement efforts declined due
to new administrative initiatives. There was not the time
or the resources to continue issuing cease and desist orders
in any regular fashion (Seavey, 1987). During 1986 the CRMC
hired more staff, started placing records on computers and
began following up on violations in a more regular fashion.
The results of these new efforts is unclear at this time.
(2) Field checks to verify CRMC violation dispositions was
often difficult if the violation was a few years old. Many
of the violations were for illegal filling. Prior to 1980
and even for 1980 - 1983 many of these violations had become
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revegetated. This made it difficult to determine where the
violation had occurred and if the area was still in
violation. This, along with the lack of information,
excluded violations prior to 1980 from this study.
There were 300 cease and desist orders issued from 1980
-1985. A random sample was taken of 30% for each year
(figure 13). CRMC personnel were interviewed and the
samples tracked through the CRMC cease and desist order,
permit application, and permit files. This check yielded
44% of the Cease and desist orders in compliance, 44% not in
compliance and 12% that were unclear. Some that were in
compliance had been issued permits, which was verified
through CRMC records. However, a field check was performed
on nineteen of those thought to be complied with and on the
eleven that were unclear. As a result 41% were found to be
in compliance, 56% in non-compliance and 3% still unclear
(figure 13).
To determine the significance of this information a "One
Sample Runs Test for Large Samples" was performed to test
for randomness, and a "Binomial Test for Large Samples" was
run. to determine the "goodness-of-fit" of the data. The
tests were done by following the instructions in Siegel
(Siegel, 1956).
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One Sample Runs Test
Eliminating the three unclear violations, it was
determined that there were 46 separate runs of complied and
non-complied violations. Thus:
N = 87
N (Non-compliance) = 50
N (Compliance) = 37
R = 46
Null hypothesis = the order of occurrence is random
Research Hypothesis = the order of occurrence is not random
Significance level = 04 = .05
Mean = aN, N'),.
Nl + N."..
= 2 (50) (37)
(50)+(37)
= 43.53
Standard Deviation = 2N.Nk(2N.N, - N. - Nh)(N \ + N1.) (N ~ + N"l.. - 1 )
z score
=
=
R - Mean
Std dev
J2 (50) (37) (2 (50) (37) - 50 - 37)(50 + 37) (50 + 37 - 1)
4.53
.. 46 - 43.53
4.53
= .55
The probability of occurrence under the null hypothesis
of z ~ .55 is P - .2912. Since the probability associated
with the observed occurrence, p ... 2912, is greater than the
level of significance,O(" .05, the null hypothesis for this
test is accepted and the order of occurrence is random.
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Binomial Test
This test is used to determine if the sample taken can be
extrapolated to the whole population (300 cease and desist
orders). The test will determine if the probability for
non-compliance is greater than the probability for
compliance. Therefore, the null hypothesis is, that, there
is a greater tendency toward compliance. The research
hypothesis is a greater tendency toward non-compliance as
the data from the sample implies.
Sample (N) = 87
Non-compliance (P) = 50 (observed frequency = .57)
Compliance (Q) = 37 (observed frequency = .43)
Significance level (~) = .05
z score = (x_ + .5) - NP
NPQ
Where x is the smaller occurrence and P and Q are the
observed frequencies. .5 is added since x(37) < NP.
= 07 + .5) - 49.59
(87)(.57)(.43)
= - 2.62
The probability associated with the occurrence of x is
.0197. Since this number is less than the significance
level the null hypothesis is rejected and the greater
tendency toward non-compliance is accepted.
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